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FREEDOM IN A REGULATORY STATE?: LAWRENCE,
MARRIAGE AND BIOPOLITICS
CRAIG WILLSE" AND DEAN SPADE*"

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper questions the status granted Lawrence v. Texas' by LGBT 2 legal
* Craig Willse is a student in Sociology at The Graduate Center, City University of New
York. His research interests include science and technology studies, political economy, and the
sociology of biomedicine. He has been an adjunct instructor in sociology and women's studies at
Hunter College.
** Dean Spade is a transgender attorney, and founder of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, a law
collective providing direct legal assistance to low-income people and people of color facing gender
identity discrimination. He thanks the many people whose comments and dialogue contributed to
ideas in this article, including Kendall Thomas, Gael Gundin Guevara, Rickke Mananzala, Sonja
Sivesind, Paisley Currah, Urvashi Vaid, and Jody Marksamer.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. We use this term "LGBT" (abbreviating Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) because
it is what is most commonly currently used by the more well-resourced organizations working on
issues of policy and law that disadvantage people on the basis of sexual orientation, though we
would contest the meaningfulness of the attempted inclusiveness of this term. The disgraceful
battles over transgender inclusion in the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA"),
backed by the Human Rights Campaign, or the New York State Sexual Orientation NonDiscrimination Act ("SONDA") backed by the Empire State Pride Agenda are only some of the
more blatant examples. See Andy Humm, Unity Eludes SONDA Advocates, Gender Identity Protection
Divides Duane, PrideAgenda, GAY CITY NEWS, Dec. 13, 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.gaycitynews.com/gen29/unity.html; See also, Kristina Krawchuk, SONDA Bill Heads
to Senate, CAPITAL NEWS 9, availableat
http://www.capitalnews9.com/content/headlines/?SecID=33&ARID=7580.
Broader failures of the "gay agenda" to include and prioritize the experiences of people
of color, people with disabilities, women, the poor and immigrants have been continually critiqued
by theorists and activists who produce intersectional and multi-issue queer and trans analysis and
activism. See, e.g., Ian Barnard, Fuck Community, or Why I Support Gay Bashing STATES OF RAGE:
EMOTIONAL ERUPTION, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 74 (Renee R. Curry and Terry L.
Allison, eds., 1996); ELI CLARE, EXILE AND PRIDE (1999); Amber Hollibaugh,Queers WithoutMony:
Thry are Everywhere. But We Refuse to See Them, VILLAGE VOICE, June 26, 2001, at 46; C. Cohen,
Punks, Bulldaggers, and Wefare Queens: The RadicalPotentialof.Queer Politics?3 GLQ 437; Craig Willse
& Jane Spade, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical Critique, 21 CHICANOLATINOL. REV. 38 (Spring 2000); Sylvia Rivera,Queens in Exile, theForotten Ones in GENDERQUEER:
VOICES FROM BEYOND THE SEXUAL BINARY 67 (Joan Nestle et al. eds. 2002); Richard Blum et al.,
Why Welfare is a QueerIssue, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 207 (2001); THAT'S REVOLTING:
QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION (Matt B. Sycamore, ed. 2004). When we speak
of our own goals for seeking an end to coercive systems of gender and sexuality, we will use a
variety of other terms intended to be more descriptive, and hopefully, more accurate of the work
we suggest. We use the term "well-resourced" where "mainstream" is often used because we wish
to be critical of the notion that these groups represent the views of a majority, which the latter term

Widener Law Review

[Vol. 11:309

organizations and advocates who have proclaimed the decision "Our Biggest
Victory Yet!"3 In short, we seek to ask the fairly obvious yet still pertinent
questions of: Who shares in this victory? What sort of victory is it?
Interestingly, one way in which organizations and advocates have expressed the
apparent significance of Lawrence is by comparing it to the legal successes of the
civil rights movement, naming it "the gay community's Brown v. Board of
Education.' 4 As Kenyon Farrow has pointed out, not only are current LGBT
rights struggles not analogous to U.S. black civil rights movements, but the
appropriation of this history by organizations that have failed to take on racial
justice struggles evidences and widens divisions between LGBT movements' and
other, anti-racist social justice struggles.6 As will become clear, Farrow's critique

would imply.
3. LAMBDA UPDATE: OURBIGGESTVICTORYYET (Civil Rights News From Lambda Legal,
Summer 2003).
4. Michael Barnett, Positive Rungfor Supporters ofEqualiy, G.W. HATCHET, July 7, 2003,
available at
http://www.gwhatchet.com/news/2003/07/07/Opinions/Column.Positive.Ruling.For.Suppor
ters.Of.Equality.446372.shtml, citing Brown v. Bd.of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. We use the word "movement" with caution, based on the idea that social movements
have as their central component a base-building goal of mass mobilization. At its inception, the
"gay rights movement" may have been characterized by such base-building in its early "take to the
streets" celebrations and its roots in uprisings against police brutality, but the institutionalization of
the work, and the move toward leadership by an elite of white legal professionals, have marked a
massive shift that makes it currently far from centralized around base building. See FourPillarsof
Transformative SodalJusticeInfrastructure,available athttp://www.miamiworkerscenter.org and on file
with the authors.
6. There have always been racial tensions in the gay community as long as there have been
racial tensions in America, but in the 1990's, the white gay community went mainstream, further
pushing non-hetero people of color from the movement. The reason for this schism is that in order
to be mainstream in America, one has to be seen as white. And since white is normative, one has
to interrogate what other labels or institutions are seen as normative in our society: family, marriage,
and military service, to name a few. It is then no surprise that a movement that goes for
"normality" would then end up in a battle over a dubious institution like marriage (and heteronormative family structures by extension).
Kenyon Farrow, Is Gay Mamiage Anti-Black?, at
http://colours.mahost.org/articles/farrow.htrml (Nov. 8,2004) [hereinafter Farrow]. Farrow cites
the continued misuse of analogies between "Gay Civil Rights" and "Black Civil Rights," instructing
that this false analogizing contributes to homophobia and strengthens resistance to gay rights. He
writes:
These comparisons of "Gay Civil Rights" as equal to "Black Civil Rights"
really began in the early 1990's, and largely responsible for this was Human
Rights Campaign (HRC) and a few other mostly-white gay organizations. This
push from HRC, without any visible black leadership or tangible support from
black allies (straight and queer), to equate these movements did several things:
1) Piss off the black community for the white gay movement's cultural
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points to exactly what, for us, is lacking in both Lawrence and the analyses of those
who celebrate it: a commitment to radical political change that challenges, rather
than accommodates, the perpetuation of inequality.
This paper examines the ways that the winning decision in Lawrence and its
aggrandizement in LGBT legal circles represents a frightening reduction in the
demands of what was, at its inception, a movement against violent and coercive
systems of gender and sexual regulation. While Lawrmnce marks a shift in the
terms of regulation and criminal stigmatization of one type of consensual adult
sexual activity, it nonetheless maintains coercive systems of regulating gender,
sexuality, and family structures through violent and punitive mechanisms.
Furthermore, an examination of the strategies of LGBT legal organizations
demonstrates ties between the lauding of the Lawrence victory and the broader
framing of a "gay agenda" that focuses on marriage rights and fails to
meaningfully oppose state regulation of sexuality, gender, and family structure.
As we will argue, the agenda put forth by the most well-resourced LGBT
organizations works towards achieving formal legal equality.7 In other words,
these organizations seek the security and entitlements distributed by regulatory
state institutions and in so doing, fail to oppose the very mechanisms that
maintain and reproduce inequality. This paper attempts to trace the links
between the Lawrence decision and campaigns for gay marriage rights in order to
envision movements that seek justice for more than just the most racially and
economically privileged lesbians and gay men. We outline the limits of the
agenda represented by Lawrence and propose alternative modes for resisting the
coercive regulation of sexuality, gender, and family formations.
The move we wish to make in this paper-from a strategy for formal legal
equality that, we argue, primarily benefits white and wealthy gay men and
lesbians, towards a radical vision of the deregulation of gender, sexuality, and
appropriation, and making the straight black community question non-hetero
black people's allegiances, resulting in our further isolation. 2) Giving the
(white) Christian Right ammunition to build relationships with black ministers
to denounce gay rights from their pulpits based on the HRC's cultural
appropriation. 3) Create a scenario in their effort to go mainstream that
equates gay and lesbian with upper-class and white.
Id. But see Randall Kennedy, Can MarriageBe Saved?, THE NATION, July 5, 2004, at 17 (dismissing
objections from black activists to analogizing racial and sexual orientation discrimination) Darren
Hutchinson has also addressed the problems with using analogies to struggles for black civil rights
when talking about gay tights. "By comparing 'blacks' and 'gays' (or racism and homophobia)"
these analogies "purport to equate, or to locate similarities between, the historical experiences of
the two groups (really white gays and black heterosexuals). In so doing, they ignore the legacy of
racial and class hierarchy-or racial and economic privilege and subordination." Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen:A RacialCritiqueof Gay andLesbian LegalTbeoy andPok'ticalDiscourse,29
CONN. L. REv. 561, 631 (1997).
7. For more on legal reform movements versus other forms of social movement, see, e.g.,
CHELA SANDOVAI, METHODOLOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Theory Out of Bounds No. 18, 2000).
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families-demands a fundamentally different account of how power operates
than that implicit in analyses of Lawrence put forth by LGBT legal organizations.
We must develop a conceptual understanding of the insidious, intimate, and
persistent nature of regulatory mechanisms if we wish to intervene in new or
interesting ways that take seriously the goals of broad social, racial, and economic
justice and the radical redistribution of capital and resources. This requires
moving away from understanding marriage as simply an enclosed institution that
either includes or excludes and towards understanding marriage as a technology
of power that organizes all parts of a population in terms of access to resources
necessary for survival. We turn to the work of Michel Foucault to guide our
discussion because it helps elucidate both the theories of power we see
underwriting much discussion of Lawrence and the theories of power that we
believe can inform queer and trans activist work to formulate more radical goals
and more effective strategies.
Ii. LAWRENCE AND DISCIPLINARY POLITICS
Drawing from the discussion of the invention of homosexuality in Michel
Foucault's The History ofSexuaiy, Vol I,8 critical legal scholars have looked at the
regulation of queer bodies in terms of discourses about acts and identities. As
Foucault outlines, the invention of homosexuality could be understood as a
solidification of an identity set in a tautological relationship with specified acts:
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of
them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case
history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a
morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology.
Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was
everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their
insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body
It was consubstantial with him,
because it was a secret that always gave itself away.
9
less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature.
So whereas a sodomite had simply been a person who practiced sodomitical acts,
the invention of a homosexual personage forged an injunctive link between a
homosexual identity and what came to be understood as homosexual acts.
Hence, the act of sodomy evidences a homosexual identity (to practice sodomy
is to be a homosexual); and, simultaneously "homosexual" defines one who
commits sodomidic acts (to be a homosexual is to practice sodomy). As with the

hysterical woman, the masturbating child, and the reproductive couple, the

8. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I: AN INTRODUCTION 1
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY].
9. Id. at 43.
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inventions of which Foucault also explored," ° the homosexual in this sense is
conceived in terms of disciplinary power. For Foucault, discipline describes
techniques of power focused on the human body-defining its corporeal
contours, organizing a subjectivity or selfhood coterminous with that body, and
arranging such bodies in relations within enclosed spaces." Thus, the identities
of discipline hold a particular bodily form and move through the enclosures of
society, including the school, the family, the army, and the prison. 2 The
management of the disciplined body unfolds through networks of medicojuridical discourse, a fact to which queer and trans bodies (discursively marked
as deviant, physically disabled, mentally ill, and criminal) can certainly attest. 3
It seems that the significance ascribed to the Lawrence decision rests in the view
that Lawrence departs from Hardwick's'4 portrayal of homosexual sodomy as
aberrant and justifiably criminalized, and embraces a more "liberating" idea that
the state cannot ban this consensual sexual act between adults based solely on
morality. As the majority and dissent take their separate positions about the
breadth of the decision, 5 the limits of this newfound liberty become clear. Both
the majority and the dissent recognize the old standard slippery slope argument:
"If you put any limit on the state power to regulate sexual behavior, soon
bestiality, incest, and rape will have to be protected from infringement as well!"
The majority wrestles with this argument as they explain that Bowers v. Hardwick
was incorrectly decided, since it provides only a moral justification for the
criminalization of sodomy. 6 The majority nonetheless promises that Lawrence
does not justify the de-criminalization of prostitution, adult incest, or other illegal
adult consensual sexual activities that could also be said to have a moral
justification of their criminal status. 7 The majority also clearly distinguishes the
issue of same sex marriage, working to make clear that Lawrence does not require

10. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 8, at 43.
11. Foucault elaborates this theme elsewhere as a discussion of "docile bodies," see, e.g.,
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 135 (Alain Sheridan

trans., 1979).
12. Id.
13. Much work in the fields of queer theory and lesbian/gay/trans studies has drawn from
the corpus of Foucault's work for inspiration. See, e.g., DAVID HALPERIN, SAINT = FOUCAULT:
TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY (1995).
14. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
16. See Lawrence, supranote 15.
17. Id. at 561. A July 28, 2004 decision by the 11 th Circuit demonstrated how narrowly the
holding in Lawrence could be read. The court, upholding an Alabama statute criminalizing the sale
of sex toys, made it clear that Lawrence did not undermine the power of the state to criminalize and
stigmatize sexual practices based on morality by finding that Lawrence establishes no right to sexual
privacy. Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
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the state to discontinue its methods of incentivizing certain sexual relationships
through the provision of a special legal status.'"
In his dissent, Scalia, not surprisingly, takes up the slippery slope argument,
suggesting that Lawrence will indeed result in opening the flood gates to same-sex
marriage, various illegal adult consensual sexual activities, and other frightening
possibilities. 9 In fact, the majority does have difficulty constructing a convincing
argument that possibilities for regulating sexuality and family structure remain
after Lawrence. This difficulty stems in part from the construction of homosexual
identity and practice in their opinion, which departs significantly from its
construction in Hardwick.
In order to de-emphasize the implications of Lawrence for other sexual acts, the
majority emphasizes a newly-validated and more palatable identity of
homosexuality.2" They do so by addressing homosexuality in terms of "coupled"
behavior, rather than specific acts of sodomy, thereby constructing a homosexual
identity more parallel to incentivized heterosexual family norms.2' This framing
contrasts sharply with Hardwick's depiction of homosexual sodomy as a longcriminalized and reviled aberrant sexual practice. The majority's attempt to rewrite the significance of sodomy, transforming it into an act constitutive of a
sympathetic identity group, moves homosexuality into the "charmed circle of
sexual practices," to use Gayle Rubin's terms.' In so doing, Lawrence rearticulates
the definitive distinction between consensual sexual/procreative practices that
the government may not criminally prohibit (contraception, abortion, sodomy)
and those in the "outer limits"23 (prostitution, adult incest, etc.) subject to
18. The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might
not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It
does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Lawrence, 535 U.S. at 590.
19. Id. at 590.
20. Id. at 560-61.
21. The Lawrence majority frames the criminal prohibition of sodomy as "control[ling] a
personal relationship," Lawrence, 535 U.S. at 558; as opposed to the Hardick framing of the right
in question as "a fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
22. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Poliics of Sexuaky, in THE
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 13 (Henry Abelove et al., eds. 1993). Rubin describes how
hierarchies are maintained by legal, medical and cultural institutions, separating "bad" sex practices
from "good" sex practices. She writes that, "[a]ll of these models assume a domino theory of sexual
peril. The line appears to stand between sexual order and chaos." Id. at 14. Both the majority and
Scalia have this domino effect in mind as they write, the majority promising that homosexual
sodomy has crossed over into "good" sex without toppling the clear line between "good" and
"bad," and Scalia warning that this decision will invite chaos.
23. Id. Patrick Califia similarly sites the limits of the Laznnce victory in-his essay "Legalizing
Sodomy is Political Foreplay." Patrick Califia, Legaitng Sodomy is Political Foreplay in THAT'S
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prohibitions. At the same time, as Rubin points out, the fact that a sexual

practice can move across that line (from a prohibited state unworthy of
protection to a protected state of relative cultural acceptance) questions the
stability of the system of sexual norms, exposing its mutability. 4 It becomes
imperative, then, for the majority to articulate dearly that they are notquestioning
a system of sexual regulation in which the state can criminalize adult consensual
sexual behavior and incentivize certain family structures on the basis of morality.
The rhetorical positioning of the majority in this case is no surprise. Courts
frequently work to make their decisions appear centrist, non-controversial, and
logically flowing from existing legal doctrines, even when overturning earlier
rulings. Depicting homosexual acts as connected to sympathetic expressions of
love, asserting that the case will not upend other moral and criminal
condemnation of sexual outsiders, and reaffirming traditional incentives and
punishments regarding the state's preferred family structure, should all be
expected from a court making the significant move of overturning a ruling that
is not even twenty years old. What is, or should be, more surprising and
disturbing, is an embrace of state regulatory power regarding sexuality and family
structure by movements that were, at their inception, opposed to such coercion.
In our view, the acceptance of state regulation of sexuality, gender, and family
structure by LGBT organizations focused on formal legal equality for lesbians
and gay men stems from an incomplete conception of the operations of power.
Given that disciplinary power coagulates the human subject as a specific body
that performs specific acts, it might be tempting to understand Lawrence as a
triumph against disciplinary power. Such a read would emphasize how Lawrence
decriminalizes an act collapsed with the identity of the homosexual and valorizes
a formerly abject subject position." However, as the contradictions in the
decision make clear, Lawrence does not challenge the mechanics of discipline itself
REVOLTING: QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 65 (Matt B. Sycamore ed. 2004).

Califia argues that the Lawrence ruling's decriminalization barely scratches the surface of the
widespread injustices still faced by people labeled as sexual deviants. Id. He discusses BD/SM
practitioners losing custody of their children, increasingly rigid "obscenity" laws being used to
confiscate pornography, increased surveillance under the U.S. Patriot Act, the continuing inability
of transgender people to obtain identification matching their gender identity, and the classification
of those who violate sex and gender norms as mentally ill. Id. Given these enduring and severe
coercive practices targeting "freaks," he suggests that the celebration of Lawrence as a victory for gay
rights should be tempered. Id.
24. Rubin, supra note 22, at 15.
25. Patricia Ticineto Clough outlines the connections between disciplinary mechanisms and
identity-based politics and argues that discipline works "through a politics of representation, by
which familial and national ideological apparatuses function to constitute subject identities, and
where resistance to these identities, and the transgression of the institutional norms that support
them, is possible, even enabled, by the instability of the strategies of disciplining." Patricia Ticineto
Clough, FutureMatters: Technoscience, GlobalPolitics,and CulturalCriticism,22 SOcIAL TEXT 1, 14 (Fall

2004).
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even if it shifts the terms of subjectification. Hence, despite its celebration as a
moment of progress towards sexual liberation, Lawrence actually serves as an
occasion to reaffirm the rights and power of the government to employ coercive
tactics for maintaining regulatory norms of gender, sexuality, and family
structures. A more cautionary or suspicious read might understand Lawrence as
a marker of the passing of the significance of disciplinary power.26 In other
words, Lawrence may suggest a loosening of certain disciplinary
mechanisms-legal holds on some sexual acts-because those mechanisms are
no longer sufficient or efficient for managing bodies and resources. Legal claims
to the body may be simultaneously taking place at registers other than the legal
individual who is apparently freed in this decision. To argue that the U.S. legal
system might not care too much about defining and regulating homosexual acts
is not to say that it is less interested in regulating sexual and family norms
through punitive and violent systems of coercion, even if it is less phobic of a
certain, limited class of homosexuals. An increasing disinterest in some aspects
of discipline indicated by Lawrence should draw our attention to how power is
regrouping in different techniques that not only address the queer as a disciplined
subject, but ensure the domination of some queers nonetheless. This, then, is to
call for another model of power for interpreting contemporary queer and trans
political oppression and politics.
III. GAY MARRIAGE AND BIoPouTIcs
To explore this other model of power, which we discuss in terms of
biopolitics, it might be useful to look at what is taken as another defining battle
in gay politics today. Of course we are not the only ones to see links between
sodomy and marriage, as the above discussion of Lawrencemakes clear. It is also
not surprising that gay politics might help us move from an analysis of discipline
to an analysis of biopower, as Foucault suggested that sexuality might have been
an increasingly important site of investment because it hinges between the
disciplinary and the biopolitical.27
A biopolitics-based analysis allows us to engage in critical thinking about the
failures of the priorities of the most well-resourced LGBT organizations, and
their failures to address the most pressing and dangerous issues facing queer and
trans people. Our concerns with this "LGBT agenda" become clear when
viewed alongside what is claimed to be the most celebrated incendiary moment
in U.S. queer struggles, the Stonewall Uprising.28 On the night of June 27,1969,
26. Michael Hardt suggests this in The Withering of Civil Sodey, 45 SOCIAL TEXT 27 (Winter
1995).
27. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETYMUSTBE DEFENDED 251-252 (David Macey trans., 2000)
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, SocIETY MUST BE DEFENDED].

28. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES (1983); MARTIN
DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993); Michael Bronski, Sylia River" 1951-2002, No Longer on the Back
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in New York City, low income gender and sexual outsiders-many of whom
were people of color and people of non-traditional gender identities-rebelled
against their systemic targeting by police. Participants in Stonewall were
struggling to survive in a city that not only criminalized their very identities, but
also excluded them from economic and educational opportunity, housing, and
bar protection from state and institutional violence. The people at the Stonewall
that night were those who lived day-to-day on the front lines of police violence,
many because they earned a living through informal street economies and found
community in night life havens like the Stonewall bar. In the decades since that
time, we have seen the consolidation of legitimacy and power in organizations
whose leadership, priorities and strategies sharply depart from these origins.
A significant force of change has been the creation of funded organizations
led primarily by white lesbians and gay men with economic and educational
privilege that claim to represent a broad-based movement for LGBT rights.29
However, the agendas of those organizations have come to focus on the rights
of people with occupational, educational, gender, and race privilege and to
marginalize or ignore the struggles of transgender people, queer and trans people
of color, and queer and trans poor people. 30 These organizations have fought for
the rights of gay youth to join the Boy Scouts, 3' but virtually ignored the struggles
of queer and trans youth who remain over represented and abused in the juvenile
justice system. They have fought for the rights of gays and lesbians to pass their
apartments on to one another 32 and to rent or buy property without facing
discrimination, 33 but have provided no assistance to queer and trans people
struggling in blatantly homophobic and transphobic homeless shelter systems
of the Bumper, available at http://zmag.org/Zmag/artides/april02bronski.htm.
29. Edmund White has written about how AIDS played a role in increasing conservative
leadership in the struggle for gay rights, in part because many of the sex radical leaders of the 1970s
died and a new leadership emerged.
Whereas the only visible gay leaders in the 1970s had been the leftist
liberationist crowd, AIDS in the 1980s flushed out of the woodwork
conservative, middle-class men, the ones who'd had no stake in coming out
previously but who now were forced by disease out of the closet. Once out,
these middle-class men seized power and know how to wield it. They brought
to the gay movement their own conservative values-including a respect for
the family and for marriage.
Edmund White, Can MariageBe Saved?, THE NATION, July 5, 2004, at 18 [hereinafter White].
30. Essex Hemphill has remarked on the history of the institutionalization of the LGBT
rights movement excluding the concerns of black gay men, noting that the "white gay community
of the 1980's was not seriously concerned with the existence of Black gay men except as sexual
objects," EssEx HEMPHILL, CEREMONIES 38 (1992).
31. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
32. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc.s, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
33. Fred Sternbach, FairHousing,LAMBDA UPDATE: OURBIGGEST VICTORY YET, at 12 (Civil
Rights News for Lambda Legal, Summer 2003).
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nationwide and in the most well-funded housing program for the poor, the
criminal justice system. They have waged battles on behalf of gay men who want
to share frequent flyer miles with their partners, 3 and lesbians who want a
couple's rate for country club membership, 35 but have entirely ignored the plight
of queer and trans prisoners who face shocking violence with no relief. The
interventions of the LGBT movement have moved away from Stonewall's
original protest of police brutality and toward a push for hate crimes legislation,
which increases the punishing power of an overtly racist criminal justice system,
36
and has never been determined to deter hate crimes or increase safety. Overall,
the "gay agenda" has narrowed increasingly over the years, with occasional
tokenization of people of color, transgender people, and other excluded groups,
to the point where its most core goals now seem utterly aligned with state
agendas to regulate sexuality and family structure.
We take recent and ongoing campaigns for same-sex marriage to exemplify the
narrow scope of this agenda and its collusion with the legal framework instated
by Lawrence. "Marriage Equality" itself is an ironic term, given that the legal
designation of marital status serves to differentiate between and to privilege select
family structures and sexual choices, and our critique of the push for same-sex
marriage and the consolidation of LGBT movement resources towards that goal
develops from an assumption that marriage itself institutes and distributes
inequalities.3" We see in current public debates about gay marriage an inability to
move from a disciplinary to a biopolitical model. For some time, marriage has
been understood as a mechanism of disciplinary society, whether or not
38
descriptions have always been couched in those exact terms. The rise of legal
34. Steinbach, supra note 33, at 7.
35. Lambda Legal filed Koebke v. Bernardo Hedts Country Club in October, 2004. For
information about the case, see
See also Marcia
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1542.
Chambers, At CountryClubs, Gay Members WantAllPrivikgesforPartners,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,2003,
at A31.
36. See Craig Wilise &Jane Spade, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism:A Radical
Critique,THE CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 38 (1999) [hereinafter Willse & Spade, Hate Crimes].
37. While same-sex marriage redresses an inequality between gays and straights, it
reinforces inequality between married people and unmarried people. It will
force homosexuals, as it now forces heterosexuals, to sign on to a particular
state-sponsored, religion-based definition of their legal relationship if they
want full rights as parents and members of households. The desire for
recognition and "normality" that motivates many of its proponents
inescapably implies that the relationships of the unmarried and those that do
not conform to conventional "family values" are less worthy of respect.
Ellen Willis, Can MarriageBe Saved?, THE NATION, July 5, 2004, at 16.
38. For an interesting discussion of the absence of an explicitly gender analysis in Foucault's
work, and suggestions for feminist applications to understand something like marriage in
Foucauldean terms, see JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER, AND THE
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institutions of marriage corresponds with the birth of disciplinary society.39
Clearly, the medico-juridical regulation of marriage (the management of biological
and economical reproduction by states and doctors)' works towards the
solidification of the enclosure of the family, guaranteeing proper relationships
between sexes within the home, and towards the channeling of all adult bodies
into such familial arrangements. We see a recognition of the operations of
discipline in critiques of marriage as a sexist institution (reproducing the
subordinate status of wives, for example, in property relations) as well as in
critiques of how it enforces normative ideals, rewarding those who meet the
demands of discipline and capital for proper reproductive arrangements.
An implicit or explicit understanding of disciplinary power not only
underwrites critiques of marriage, but also runs through discourse supporting gay
marriage. Advocates for gay marriage will acknowledge that marriage is a flawed
institution, and the flaws they point out are those very techniques of discipline
described above-its exclusionary principles and its enforcement of ideologies
ofgender inequality.4 Advocates, however, set aside these disciplinary concerns,
BODY (1991).
39. The family cell, in the form in which it came to be valued in the course of the
eighteenth century, made it possible for the main elements of the deployment
of sexuality (the feminine body, infantile precocity, the regulation of births,
and to a lesser extent no doubt, the specification of the perverted) to develop
along its two primary dimensions: the husband-wife axis and the parentschildren axis.
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALTY, supra note 8, at 108.
40. Decisions in cases concerning the legitimacy of the marriages of transsexual women often
demonstrate the underlying gender-regulatory notions that are at the root of the marital contract.
For example, in M.T. vj.T, the court focuses on the capacity of the woman's surgically constructed
vagina when determining whether she is a woman for purposes of marriage. M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d
204,205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). The court spares no detail:
The examination ofplaintiff before the operation showed that she had a penis,
scrotum and testides. After the operation she did not have those organs but
had a vagina and labia which were "adequate for sexual intercourse" and could
function as any female vagina, that is, for "traditional penile/vaginal
intercourse." The "artificial vagina" constructed by such surgery was a cavity,
the walls of which are lined initially by the skin of the penis, often later taking
on the characteristics of normal vaginal mucosa; the vagina, though at a
somewhat different angle, was not really different from a natural vagina in size,
capacity and "the feeling of the walls around it." Plaintiff['s] ... vagina had a
"good cosmetic appearance" and was "the same as a normal female vagina
after a hysterectomy." Dr. Ihlenfeld had seen plaintiff since the operation and
she never complained to him that she had difficulty having intercourse....
[l-l]e no longer considered plaintiff to be a male since she could not function
as a male sexually either for purposes of "recreation or procreation."
Id. at 206.
41. This line of argument often posits gay marriage as one step towards a state of justice, an
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citing broader access to the institution and the rights it guarantees as a form of
progress.42 Justification for supporting the disciplinary institution of marriage is
grounded in the economic and social entitlements attached to it.43 Furthermore,
the symbolic significance of marriage is cited in family-values terms by
mainstream gay rights groups that argue that access to entitlements such as
property rights represents a legitimation of the formerly abjectified identity of the
homosexual;" the fact that Laurence addresses the validity of homosexual
relationships attests to this. However, our argument is that these social and
economic entitlements are mechanisms of biopolitics, and that far from marking
an incremental liberation of the disciplined subject, they in fact mark operations
of power that discipline cannot fully describe.
What then do we mean by biopolitics? If discipline operates at the level of the
body of the individual subject, biopolitics operates at the level of the mass of
bodies or the population. Biopolitics is characterized by the production of a
population with overall "characteristics of birth, death, production, illness, and
so on."45 If disciplinary mechanisms are discursive (in legal or medical contexts,
for example), biopolitical mechanisms are statistical, grounded in collections and
calculations of data.' Some aspects of biopolitics to which Foucault alludes
impartial and imperfect transition in a history of progress. So, while the flaws of marriage are
acknowledged, they are deemed less important that what is gained. Evan Wolfson describes this
as "patchwork" advances in arguing that all gays should support marriage. Evan Wolfson, Is now
real# the rght time tofightfor the freedom to mary?, at
htrp://www.freedometomarry.org/document.asp?docit=2438.
42. See White, supra note 29, at 18.
Until a year ago I would have sniffed at the gay pro-marriage movement as just
one more effort on the part of gay neocons to assimilate with their white
middle-class, straight friends and relatives.... The question for me is no
longer one of lifestyle but rather of civil rights. Lesbians and gays should have
all the same rights as straights. Some of the rights we gained earlier were
peripheral (and often reversible), whereas marriage goes right to the heart of
national concepts of community and the future.
This is folded into a narrative of gay rights as a "civil rights" struggle, a position critiqued by
Kenyon Farrow. See Farrow, supra note 6.
43. The Mississippi American Civil Liberties Union estimates that civil unions in
Massachusetts will extend 350 benefits to partners, and marriage would extend about another 1400
rights. See http://www.msaclu.org/marriage-benefits.htm. "According to the GAO, there are
1,138 federal statutes in which marital status factors into benefits and rights." For Richer or Poorer
For All but Royaly, Weddings Were Once Modest Affairs; Now They Are a $50 Billion Annual Industry,
MOTHERJONES, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 24-25.
44. Judith Stacey, Gay and Lesbian Families: .Queer Like Us, in ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW
POLICIES FORA NEW CENTURY 144 (Mary Ann Mason et al. eds. 2nd ed. 2003). See also JUDITH
STACEY, in THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POST MODERN AGE
(1996).
45. FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED, spranote 27, at 242.
46. Id.
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include the census and health insurance programs.4 7 Biopolitics depends upon
generalizations and forecasts, and therefore does not concern itself with the
individual body, as would discipline." The disciplining of the family that arranges
sexed relations between bodies towards reproduction makes possible a broader
and more general regulation of the birthrate across a mass of familial
enclosures.49 In other words, if discipline manages the family in terms of
gendered relations, including reproduction, biopolitics manages the nation in
terms of phenomena such as population patterns.
As Foucault writes, the purpose of statistical measures, for example, "is not
to modify any given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar
as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these
general phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality."5"
The forces that discipline arranges within the family, biopolitics massifies across
families and throughout society.5' Disciplinary power, then, concerns the
individual subject, how the subject sees himself or is seen by society, and what
he is or is not allowed or encouraged to do based on his subject position.52
Biopolitics concerns the distribution of life chances across the population, the
collection of data about this distribution and the regulation of resources at this
general level.53
A biopolitical analysis, therefore, requires moving away from only
understanding marriage as an institution, or an enclosure, and beginning to think
of it as a technology or mechanism for channeling resources and populations.
A disciplinary analysis of gay marriage cites its ideological struggles-attempts to
change the meaning of that cultural institution. Similarly, an analysis of Lawrence
in terms of discipline emphasizes ideological changes in the identity category of
the homosexual, as it comes to signify a member of a committed partnership. A
biopolitical analysis looks to a register other than ideology or meaning, and draws
attention instead to how marriage serves to set populations in relation to
resources such as medical insurance and how that impacts life chances. Thus,
while advocates of same-sex marriage suggest it will challenge the very institution
of marriage and its ability to maintain ideological norms regarding gender and
sex,5 4 we argue that the legalization of same-sex marriage simply redirects and
intensifies biopolitical functions of the state.
47. FOUCAULT, supra note 27, at 243.
48. Id.
49. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 8, at 107.
50. FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED, supra note 27, at 246.

51. Id.
52. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, spra note 8, at 47-48.

53. This is also outlined by Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Contr, OCTOBER 59,
at 3 (Winter 1992).
54. SeeLAMBDA UPDATE: LEADINGTHE CHARGE FOR MARRIAGE (Civil Rights News from
Lambda Legal, Summer 2004).
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We see indications of a biopolitical critique of marriage in feminism and
women's rights movements, but this analysis has been neglected by LGBT
organizations that both celebrate Lawrence and seek gay marriage rights. Those
feminists and other thinkers and activists understand marriage as fundamentally
an institution of private property originally designed to both make women into
the property of men and to make women's property into men's property.'5
Though this legal-economic function of marriage may have historically leaned on
ideological (or disciplinary) justification about proper roles and activities of men
and women,5 6 we can see clearly how it addresses sub-populations (those marked
as male and those as female) in terms of access to resources, such as property
claims. The first social welfare programs in the United States were entirely
shaped around traditional notions of male and female citizenship. Male
citizenship was recognized in relation to military service to the republic, and
women's citizenship was defined by their marriage to men who had rights to civic
participation that women lacked, including suffrage, the right to serve on juries,
and the right to claim American nationality independent of marital status.57 The
first legal rights that women won with the passage of the Married Women's
Property acts and creation of maternal child custody preference again reinforced
women's role as wife and mother and the connection of resource allocation to
a family role. s Even the first wage and hour laws resulted from protectionist
legislation that framed women as the weaker sex, needing protection in the
workplace in order to preserve their childbearing abilities.59 In light of this,
feminists have fought long and hard to reduce the legal significance of marriage
in order to increase the articulation of independent citizenship for women and
to reduce the significance of marriage as a coercive institution. They have further
sought to make it easier to get out of undesired marriages, understanding that
obstacles to divorce made it more difficult for women to exit economically
dependent and, too often, violent relationships with men.60
55. For an historical analysis, see, e.g., MARY LYNDON
1850-1895 (1993).
56. Id.

SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE AND

THE LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND,

57. Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Onigins of the American

Welfare State in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 92 (Linda Gordon ed. 1990).
58. Id. at 97.
59. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394-5 (1937).
60. In her remarks at the Solidarity Socialist Feminist Retreat in 2003, Ann Glatt connected
Bush's current push to coerce women on welfare into marriage to recent efforts by the right wing
to roll back the advances that have been made in divorce law to make it easier for people to get out
of marriages, making clear the use of marriage as a specific strategy for limiting regulating sexuality
and family structure. Ann Glatt, Oregon Human Rights Coalition, Remarks at Solidarity Socialist
Feminist Retreat, May 30-June 2, 2003, Sonoma, CA. A recent case illustrates these dangers. In
December 2004, the Associated Press reported that a judge in Spokane had rescinded a divorce
granted by a commissioner upon finding out that the woman seeking the divorce was pregnant,
citing a Washington state law establishing that any child born within 300 days of a divorce is
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Not surprisingly, these battles rage on, and low-income women and women
of color remain the primary targets for the coercive regulation of gender,
sexuality, and family structure through marriage. The welfare reform debates of
the mid-19 9 0's focused heavily on the sexual choices of welfare moms, myths
about their continued childbearing outside of marriage, and an overblown panic
about teenage pregnancy, all of which supported reduction in benefits that
primarily impacted women of color.61 Recently, George W. Bush proposed that
$1.5 billion of welfare money be dedicated to "healthy marriage promotion"; that
is an increase in coercive measures pushing low-income women into marriage.6 2
These policies not only have a disproportionate effect on poor queer women, 63
who are often forced to choose between revealing the paternity of their children
or losing benefits, 64 but also severely affect women who are survivors of
domestic violence. 65 In redirecting federal monies to correcting and controlling
the sexual behavior of poor women, such polices reinforce a notion that poverty
results from the moral failings of the poor, rather than from economic,
biopolitical arrangements that require a pool of unemployed laborers to maintain
low wages and uphold the consolidation of capital. 66 While we might expect an
alliance between poor women and queer and trans folks, all of whom bear the
brunt of policies designed to coerce people into a limited notion of family
structure, instead we find LGBT organizations currently aligned with George W.
Bush's position, advocating loudly that marriage is the backbone of society, an
presumed to fathered by the husband in the divorce. The husband in the case had been convicted
of abuse in 2002, and had not contested his wife's filing for divorce, but the judge ruled that no
divorce could be granted until paternity was established. WashingtonStateJudge Refuses to Let Prgnant
Woman Divorce,ASSOCIATED PRESS, Washington, D.C., Dec. 2004.
61. Holloway Sparks, Queens, Teens andModel Mothers: Race, Gender, and the Discourse of Wefare
Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 171 (Sanford F. Schram et al. eds. 2003)

at 188-89.
62. Current Republican proposals for the reauthorization include an increase in work
requirements to 40 hours a week and $200 million in federal grants plus $100 million in state
matching grants for marriage promotion programs. Jonathan Riskind, House Set to Revisit Weffare
Reform this Week: Legislatorsto Vote on Bill Very Similarto One Passedin May, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Feb. 12, 2003, at A. See also Sharon Tubbs & Thomas C. Tobin, When Government Wants Mariage
Reform, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2003, at D; also available at
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/arns3/npmbasis.html.
63. See Richard E. Blum, et al., Why Welfare is aQueerIssue, N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
26, 207 (2001).
64. Id.
65. "A 1996 study conducted by the Taylor Institute asserts that up to 80% of women
receiving public assistance may be survivors of, or are attempting to escape, violent relationship."
available at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/health humsvc/welfare/fvo.html#client.
Because
economic coercion is often a part of domestic violence relationships, tying receipt of public benefits
to incentives to marry or stay in marital relationships further endangers women.
66. FRANCIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWER, REGULATING THE POOR (Pantheon 1971).
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essential right that should not be denied to same-sex couples, and, implicitly, a
reasonable method of distributing life chances such as child custody and health
care.
Framing same-sex marriage in terms of healthcare access is particularly
misleading, and similarly suggests an embrace of the status quo of uneven
67
distribution of health chances within a biopolitical context. Campaigns for state
legislated same-sex marriage frequently refer to employment-based health care
benefits and hospital visitation rights as primary examples of the marital benefits
to which those campaigns would expand access. However, the reduction in fulltime jobs with benefits and the discrimination queer and trans people face in job
markets both suggest that fewer and fewer queer/trans workers have access to
6
employment-based health care benefits. " Given this, marriage rights would not
seem the best strategy for insuring health care to our communities. Furthermore,
these same marriage-focused LGBT organizations have given no indication of a
commitment to broad-based struggles for increased health care access for all
queer and trans people; they have failed to direct resources towards opposing
cuts in Medicaid and Medicare; and they have neglected opportunities to build
alliances with social justice organizations focused on single-payer health care
system proposals. Forming such alliances would force recognition that the
distribution of resources, such as health benefits, evidences vast inequalities in
terms of class and ethnicity; the biopolitical analysis we seek to develop explains
this as the formation of populations with access to life resources, and populations
without such resources. The concern about hospital visitation and end of life
health decisions also seems in many ways overstated, since health care proxy
forms and other simple legal agreements (usually basic forms requiring minimal
legal assistance) can resolve these problems. However, providing direct services
and assistance to queer and trans people who cannot afford private legal advice
has never been a priority of the institutions leading the "marriage equality" battle.
They are busy representing country club members.
The underlying assumptions and principles of the struggle for same-sex
marriage mirror those of the Lawrence majority: an acceptance of existing criminal
and civil incentives for compliance with regulatory norms regarding sexual
practices and family structures.69 This LGBT agenda asks only for what the
67. The U.S. census bureau estimated that 43.6 million Americans did not have health
insurance in 2002, an increase of 2.4 million from 2001, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf.
68. This certainly correlates with the elimination of union jobs in the U.S. According to the
U.S. Department of Labor, 12.9% of wage and salary workers were union members in 2003. In
1983, 20.1% of wage and salary workers were in unions, availabk at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
69. Laura Kipnis has written that statistical evidence of the dissatisfaction with marriage that
so many married Americans (40% in the study she cites) feel suggests a larger political significance
to the institution of unhappy marriage.
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Court grants in that case: a slight shift in the terms of that coercive framework,
creating inclusion for people who would benefit from marriage but for their
desire to partner with a person of the same sex. In this sense, such work upholds
marriage as a mechanism for organizing populations in relation to resources for
life chances. While same-sex marriage would redirect some resources towards
those people who have enough economic privilege" to benefit from marriage
(money to inherit, private health insurance benefits to share) but who can't
currently marry, it does not disrupt the distribution of economic resources
themselves. 7
[W]hat if luring a populace into conditions of emotional stagnation and
deadened desire were actually functional for society? ...

If modern marriage has transpired into a social institution devoted to
maximizing obedience and the work ethic while minimizing freedom and
mobility, to renouncing excess desires (and whatever quantities of imagination
and independence they come partnered with) in exchange for love and
companionship, clearly there are social advantages here: The psychology of
marital stasis is remarkably convergent with that of a cowed work force and
a docile electorate. Who needs a policeman on every comer with such
emotional conditions in effect?
Laura Kipnis, Can Marriage Be Saved?, THE NATION, July 5, 2004, at 19. She suggests that if most
people leave marriages because of "wanting more freedom," gay marriage as a political demand
seems depressingly non-libratory.
70. [Marriage] favors the interests of the propertied and privileged. That is
why marital stability correlates with employment, income and education,
particularly for men. Admitting same-sex couples to this primarily bourgeois
club will likely intensify discrimination against the unmarried and their
kin-the explicit goal of marriage-promotion campaigns now directed at
welfare recipients. It will replace sexual-orientation discrimination with even
harsher discrimination by marital status.
Judith Stacey, Can MarriageBe Saved?, THE NATION, July 5, 2004, at 25.
71. Certainly, family recognition (child custody and visitation rights specifically) is also an
important aspect of marriage, and the recognition of same-sex marriages would allow certain people
to secure their rights to their children through the law. However, while it would assist certain
individuals and families who are currently cruelly deprived of recognition of their connection to
their children, it still maintains the broader coercive framework, punishing those who don't submit
to marriage by continuing to deprive them of family recognition. We support broader frameworks
of family recognition reform, many promoted by feminist and queer organizations strongly before
the 'gay marriage' battle eclipsed them, which focused on flexible, individualized and contextual
possibilities for legally enforceable agreements related to child rearing. Many other communities
have long histories of being deprived rights to procreation or family recognition or of having their
children taken away from them, including Native Americans, mothers on public assistance, people
with disabilities, and prisoners. In the case of prisoners, these issues have become even more
significant in recent years as the rate of incarceration has skyrocketed for women due to Drug War
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RAISING THE STAKES

The current agenda of the well-resourced LGBT movement does not only put
forward too-narrow demands; the limits of the agenda itself derive from an
underlying conception of the operations of power that suggests these as the most
reasonable demands for achieving formal legal equality. Again, organizing
towards formal legal equality fundamentally departs from the early calls for
"liberation" in the Stonewall era. Two potential frameworks for understanding
discrimination might be said to exist as options for this work. One would
suggest that discrimination or oppression is fundamentally an individual problem:
a person is denied an opportunity to work, or to live somewhere, or to access
benefits from the state based on a personal quality that has nothing to do with
that activity (such as sexual orientation). This model of discrimination fits with
an analysis of how discipline targets the individual subject. Within such a
framework, the obvious remedy is individual rights-the right not to be denied
access to a job or apartment, for example, on the basis of one's sexual
orientation. Another view of discrimination or oppression suggests that it is a
condition that situates people and affects their life chances, and that it happens
systemically, not just to individuals, but to entire communities or populations,
policies that criminalize poverty, and as new laws have terminated incarcerated mothers' parental
rights as early as 18 months after incarceration. See CORRECTIONAL ASSoC. OF N.Y., WOMEN IN
PRISON PROJECT, THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT ON FAMILIES, available at
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publication/Children-of-Incarcerated-Parents.pdf.; Ann
Farmer, Mothers in Prison Losing All ParentalRights, WOMEN'S ENEWS, June 21, 2002, available at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/947; Nel Bernstein, Terminating Motherhood:
How the Drug War Has Stamped an Entire Class of Parents as Permanenty Unfit, available at
http://www.asentenceoftheirown.com/Essays%20-/20Terminating.html. These struggles of other
communities facing government attack on familial relationships and child rearing rights suggest a
possibility for significant solidarity work between communities, a possibility foreclosed by the
decision to instead seek marriage rights through a rhetoric that further stigmatizes unmarried
people, strengthens regulatory family norms, and fails to think critically about race. As Priya
Kandaswamy noted in a recent interview when asked whether gay marriage is important because
it will protect parental rights:
In the U.S., race is the strongest determinant of whether or not the state
chooses to recognize your parental ties. Black families are the most likely of
any racial group to be disrupted by Child Protection authorities, and 42
percent of all children in foster care in the U.S. are black. If being married
doesn't protect straight black families from having their children taken away,
it's unlikely that it will protect queer black families."
Is Gay Marriage Radst: A Conversation with Marlon M. Bailey, Pnya Kandaswamy, and Mattie Udora
Richardson, inTHAT'S REVOLTING: QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 87,89 (Matt
B. Sunstien ed. 2004). During that same interview, Marion M. Bailey noted: "We should not
assume, in a racist, sexist, heterosexist, and homophobic society, that all people will have access to
the so-called rights and privileges that marriage purports to offer." Id.
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creating an uneven distribution of life chances; this fits with biopolitics as
outlined by Foucault and recapitulated in our paper. The remedy under the latter
view is redistribution, and entails a critical view of the status quo such that
removing barriers to an individual's access to rights or benefits will not be
enough.72 It also requires an LGBT movement that struggles for racial and
economic justice.
In our view, the individual rights perspective has been chosen as the LGBT
agenda, and redistributionist liberation struggles have been undermined and cast
aside. It is the choice to fight for hate crimes laws, framing violence against our
community in terms of individual criminal acts rather than decades of targeted
police harassment and violence.73 It is the choice to bring individual law suits for
rich queers denied the rights to pass on apartments to their partners, but to take
no stand in the struggle for affordable housing, shelter access, or the elimination
of public housing programs. It is the choice to frame health care in terms of a
battle for marital rights so that those few queers with private health insurance can
add their partners, but to ignore the disproportionate numbers of queer and trans
people who rely on declining Medicaid and Medicare programs for basic care, and
those queer and trans people in state custody who are denied medical care those
routinely.74 It is the choice to virtually ignore the most vulnerable members of
72. The failures of formal legal equality to address systemic maldistribution of power have
been well-articulated by Critical Race Theorists. See A.D. Freeman, Legitimizjng RacialDiscriminalion
ThroughAntidisiminafion Law: a Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrinein CRITICAL RACE THEORY
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29 (Kimberle' Crenshaw et al., eds. 1995)
[hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY]. See also Cheryl I Harris, Whiteness as Properly, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, at 276.
73. See Willse & Spade, Hate Crimes, supra note 36.
74. Marion M. Bailey argues,
The crux of this movement is led by white, middle-dass gays and lesbians who
would largely benefit from same-sex marriage .... What these white queers are
not concerned about.., is the vast majority of people of color who do not
enjoy such social mobility and who are largely disenfranchised, and who need
health care and don't have it, etc.
Supra note 71, at 91. Mattie Udora Richardson echoes this concern, stating
This question about hospital visitation [im the argument for supporting samesex marriage] is always linked to the issue of gaining access to spousal health
insurance. I think it's ridiculous to have health care contingent on
employment status.... I'd like for society to truly honor families in their
diversity and to actually have a commitment to the health and well-being of
everyone-regardless of citizenship, marital and employment status.
Id. at 89. Following a similar track, asking that we take one step further back from analyzing the
benefits of same sex marriage by questioning the distribution of privileges overall, Priya
Kandaswamy responds to the argument that same-sex marriage will be good for queer immigrants
in the same interview.
It is true that theoretically if you and your partner were able to have a legally
recognized marriage, it may have allowed your partner to remain in the
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our "community," including immigrants and prisoners.
This agenda based on individual rights consistently articulates the single issue
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a way that limits the impact
of its work to those people for whom sexual orientation is the only or one of
very few vectors of discrimination. It takes the status quo as a given, and argues
only for formal equality within the existing distribution of life chances.75 For
those reasons, many of its wins are primarily symbolic-a shift in ideological
constructions of proper sexual behavior, for example. From such a viewpoint,
decriminalization of sodomy statutes becomes the most important legal victory
possible, despite the fact that a very small number of queer and trans people are
incarcerated for sodomy, but a disproportionate number are incarcerated for
crimes of poverty such as loitering, prostitution, and possession or sale of illegal
drugs. Both in its legal and rhetorical strategies, this agenda upholds the status
quo of maldistribution, and continually asserts, as did the Lawrence Court, that its
demands will not disturb that status quo. For example, Lambda Legal's recent
"Leading the Charge for Marriage" publication frames their outpouring of
resources toward the struggle for same-sex marriage as an issue of increasing
choice for same-sex couples.76 "We're fighting for lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender people to have the same choices as everyone else: the choice to be
honest about who we are; the choice to start a family; the choice to live where we

country. However, I think that there are a couple of important things to
consider before taking this as a reason to endorse gay marriage. The first
question that I would ask you is: Was your partner really deported because the
two of you couldn't get married? Or was s/he deported because of racist
immigration policies that readily exploit immigrant labor while at the same
time forcing millions of immigrants to live in constant fear of deportation
because the state refuses to grant them legal status in this country?
Id at 90.
75. Last year, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom was applauded by the gay marriage
advocates as he endorsed their struggle. He is the same politician against whom a multi-racial,
multi-income, queer and straight alliance fought during his bid for office because of his extreme
anti-poor and anti-welfare views. His endorsement of these two positions, against poor people, and
for gay marriage, demonstrate the fact that gay marriage does not challenge the overwhelming
maldistribution in our society which Newsom supports and works to increase. The benefits of
marriage being primarily property rights, this policy change does not redistribute wealth but rather
enters same-sex couples into institutions that have been designed for centuries to ensure the
maintenance of the wealth gap, such as inheritance. See Matt B. Sycamore, Breaking Glass: An
Introduction,in THAT'S REVOLTING: QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 5 (Matt B.
Sycamore ed. 2004); Tommi A. Mecca, It's All About Class, in THAT'S REVOLTING: QUEER
STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASsIMILATION 21 (Matt B. Sycamore ed. 2004).
76. Kevin M. Carthcart, Moving L'gbt Years Ahead TowardFull Equait, LAMBDA UPDATE:
LEADING THE CHARGE FOR MARRIAGE, at 2 (Civil Rights News From Lambda Legal, Summer
2004).
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want; the choice to get married."77 This assertion of free will masks the coercive
functions of state, relies on an imagined "everyone else" who is free to make such
choices as long as they are not lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender, and
presumes that all7 8or even most of "us" will be able to access those choices once
marriage is legal.
We envision a broader framework for queer and trans rights, one that makes
redistribution a central goal. Some of the benefits currently conferred upon
married couples, such as the ability to immigrate to the U.S. and the recognition
of ties to children produced in a family, are no doubt fundamental to human
dignity, but expanding them ever-so-slightly to include a new class of people, and
strengthening the legitimacy of state conferred marital status, rather than working
on deeper reforms of those instances of maldistribution, is short-sighted and
unjust. It is not simply what the sodomy decriminalization/same-sex marriage
"rights" package does that concerns us, but what it fails to do. The allocation of
virtually all the resources of the institutionalized LGBT movement toward these
goals, and the abandonment (increasing as the marriage battle heats up) of
broader goals that affect more queers, especially those in more dire
circumstances, is unacceptable.
The most just approach to opposing gender and sexual orientation oppression
would be to devote resources first to the struggles of those who experience the
greatest impact of that discrimination: people surviving in prisons, people in
foster care and juvenile justice, people accessing health care through Medicaid,
people working in low-wage jobs or surviving on benefits, people struggling
against immigration policies, people experiencing the intersections of racism and
sexual and gender coercion. Those locations, where the most violent effects of
these coercive systems occur, should be the initializing points of action, as they
were at Stonewall, both because of the urgency of those quests for survival and
because they are most instructive of the operations of power. Additionally, these
would be the proper starting points of our work because they would make clear
the location of our alliances and our place in a struggle with others who bear the
brunt of state and institutional violence. Our messages about family integrity
should echo those of prison abolitionists fighting to preserve the parental rights
of incarcerated mothers, not of George W. Bush as he articulates sexist and
heterosexist moral judgments against welfare mothers. As we see the increasing
wealth gap in the U.S. and the increasing consolidation of capital worldwide,
fueled by policies decreasing protections of workers, the natural environment,
and aimed at criminalizing poverty and promoting white supremacy, we should
recognize that a necessary result will be a growing resistance of rising numbers
of people endangered by these changes. It is with them that we should cast our
lot and expect to be victorious.
77. Cathcart, supra note 76, at 2.
78. See Carol Queen, Never a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride, in THAT'S REVOLTING: QUEER
STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 85 (Matt B. Sycamore ed. 2004).

